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ABSTRACT 
Author: Surendra C. Ratwatte 
Title: The Effect of Culture on the Management of Advanced 
Automation: An Analysis of Two Airlines 
Institution: Embry Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Master of Aeronautical Science 
Year: 1999 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between 
National, Organizational and Professional Cultures and the attitudes toward 
managing advanced automation among the flightcrew of two international airlines. 
The Flight Management Attitudes Questionnaire developed by the University of 
Texas was utilized to determine the attitudes and perceptions held by airline pilots 
of various nationalities who fly late model Airbus and Boeing airliners. A census 
survey was conducted at the crew bases of the two airlines, one in the Middle East 
and other in South Asia. A total of 230 completed surveys were received. Chi 
Square analysis was used to establish significance between the different variables. 
The results show that national culture as well as age, rank, aircraft type, training, 
and levels of computer literacy, have a profound effect on the strategies and 
approaches used by pilots of the survey sample in managing automation. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
As the twentieth century draws to a close, what could be a better symbol of 
all that mankind has achieved in the course of the last hundred years, than the 
airplane? Aviation is arguably the most enduring of all the accomplishments 
humanity has made this century. Military aviation changed the face of warfare and 
helped established global domination. Commercial airliners have fostered it by 
fostering world trade and tourism. In the space of less than a hundred years, 
humans have not only realized the age old dream of flight, but progressed from 
fragile contraptions of wood and fabric to the huge behemoths that routinely ply 
the skies today. 
In many ways commercial airplanes also represent a synthesis of the great 
technological achievements of this century. The gigantic airplanes that are so 
much a part of life today, epitomize the design and manufacturing capabilities that 
have enabled western civilization to dominate the last few centuries. The vibrant 
and global nature of the airline industry, is visible proof of the West's dominance 
both in economic theory and practice. 
Safety Levels 
The outstanding safety record of the aviation industry are a reflection of 
this century's obsession with industrial safety (Goetsch, 1996). The scale of the 
improvement in aviation safety, is best judged by the fact that the travelling public 
has awarded the airline industry the ultimate accolade of our era. It is so safe that 
it is regarded as boring. What was a life threatening endeavor to the Wright 
brothers, has become a tedious but essential mode of transportation in the late 
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twentieth century. The irony would not be lost on the pioneers, who experienced 
the appalling conditions of the early years and watched as many friends and 
colleagues fell prey to the "hunter", the many mysterious and often unexplained 
crashes that dogged the industry (Gann, 1961). 
Today accidents are a rarity, with less than two crashes occurring per 
million airline departures, a statistically insignificant number (Boeing, 1998). The 
figure is so miniscule that a former U.S. Transportation Secretary (Mr. Pefia), 
even postulated a goal of "zero accidents" as an achievable target for the industry. 
Preliminary results from last year show that this was by no means a fanciful 
notion. 1998 was a landmark year for the aviation industry, with no passenger 
fatalities reported on U.S. airlines for the first time since records were kept 
(NTSB, 1999). Accidents are so rare, that they are the focus of intense media 
scrutiny. They also lead to years of painstaking investigation to find out what 
actually happened, in order to further improve what is considered the safest means 
of transportation in the history of mankind. 
Microprocessor Power 
Technological marvels that they are, modern airliners harness the power of 
the microprocessor (that other singular invention of our era) to a greater degree 
than most other forms of transport. Recent airplanes such as the Boeing 777 and 
the Airbus 340 rely on "fly-by-wire" technology to stay in the air. Were the banks 
of computers located below the cockpit not working, the aircraft would be 
incapable of flying (Airbus, 1992 - Boeing, 1995). 
Computers also form the backbone of the cockpit that Gann's successors 
work in today. Automation, another obsession of the late twentieth century, has 
been incorporated into aircraft flightdecks for some time. The present generation 
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of aircraft spend the greater amount of their working lives coupled to the autopilot 
systems that are used by the pilots to control them. On the latest models of 
aircraft, all pilot inputs are through the autopilot, with manual control of the 
aircraft by the "traditional" mechanical control paths being a thing of the past 
(Airbus, 1992). The implications of the increased use of automation is a matter of 
some concern, as it would appear that some accidents have been caused (at least in 
part) by the pilots misunderstanding the system (Bordoni, 1997). 
Globalization of the Airline Industry 
Commercial aviation in the developed world however, is approaching 
market saturation. The demise of the Soviet Union and the opening up of 
mainland China has led to fundamental changes in the marketplace. Increasingly, 
the primary markets are in places far away from the manufacturers' bases in 
Western Europe and North America. Perusal of the primary producers order 
books, reveals that it is airlines in Asia and the Middle East that are of increasing 
importance (World Airline Fleets, 1998). Yet this is a part of the world that has a 
significantly different safety record to the west, a fact that cannot be ignored. To 
compound the problem, the pilots who fly these aircraft are often from cultures 
that have radically different values and beliefs to those of the western designers of 
the aircraft. 
Statement of the Problem 
The industry has not ignored the possible implications of these factors. The 
safety record (and rate) has long been a focus of the manufacturers' and 
regulators' efforts to understand the root causes of aircraft accidents. The 
increasing prevalence of automation and the effect this could have on safety has 
also been researched to a considerable degree. Recently, interest has also turned to 
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the possible effect of culture in the flightdeck. A better understanding of the effect 
culture has on pilot behavior and perception, particularly in respect to highly 
automated aircraft, may be the path to new ways to further improve the safety rate. 
By studying pilots within one organization who are from different parts of the 
world, it may be possible to isolate this factor. 
Significance of the Problem 
A sustained rate of one accident per million aircraft departures is obviously 
an outstanding achievement, and a source of pride to the entire industry. However, 
with airline growth forecast to continue, the present risk level will lead to 
unacceptable numbers of accidents in the near future. Unless the rate is reduced 
substantially, analysts estimate that the figure could conceivably be as high as one 
major accident per week by the year 2010 (Russell, 1996). If we are to avert an 
industry-wide catastrophe, some significant advances in the accident rate have to be 
made soon. The problem is especially acute for those airlines that employ pilots 
from many different nationalities. These companies tend to be relatively young and 
small in size, though with a high profile due to aggressive advertising campaigns. 
Accidents tend to have a much greater effect on such an operation than on a well-
established airline with a secure reputation. All possible avenues of improvement 
must be fully explored if we are to reduce the accident rate to any significant 
degree. The cost to the industry in terms of credibility and lives will be immense if 
it is not. 
CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE AND RESEARCH 
Aviation is a discipline with an enormous body of literature to its credit. 
As one of the more emotive achievements of humanity this century, most aspects 
of aviation have been the subject of extensive research. Aircraft accidents are bad 
publicity for a high profile industry. The airlines, manufacturers and regulatory 
agencies have all combined their resources to analyze what is an expensive 
problem. Automation management and cultural issues, though of more recent 
vogue, have also been the subject of exhaustive and innovative research projects 
in the recent past. This chapter will report on work already accomplished on the 
three issues (safety, automation and culture) that are the focus of this thesis. 
Analyzing Safety 
While aviation is extremely safe, the occasional mishap usually leads to an 
exaggerated response by the media. A more balanced and analytical approach to 
accidents statistics has been taken by the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group. 
Known as the "Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents", this 
annually published document is the accepted benchmark of aircraft safety 
performance. 
The Accident Rate 
Accidents involving the total loss of the aircraft (known in industry 
parlance as a hull loss) account for most fatal accidents. Boeing has tracked the 
hull loss rate (per million departures) over the entire history of jet aircraft, from 
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1959 to the present. After an initial spurt of crashes in the early years, the rate 
decreased dramatically to approximately 1.4 accidents per million departures. 
However, this figure then plateaued in the mid-70s and has scarcely changed over 
the last twenty years. Also included in the same document, is a very interesting 
sub-analysis on "accident rates by years following introduction" (Boeing, 1998 
pp. 14). This graph shows that all the four "generations" of jet aircraft have 
suffered a number of accidents in the first few years of operation and then 
decreased to the average figure within four to six years. 
Western Dominance 
It must be remembered that the primary manufacturers of large 
commercial aircraft currently number only two. Boeing-McDonnell Douglas on 
the West Coast of the United States and Airbus Industrie of Europe are the only 
significant players left in the marketplace. These quintessentially Western 
companies make the aircraft that the rest of the world flies, with some types (like 
the Boeing 777) enjoying far greater sales success in Asia than in America or 
Europe (World Airline Fleets, 1998). 
It also must be noted that most of the world's jet aircraft are in fact owned 
and operated by a handful of companies. The U.S. "Big Five"(American, United, 
Delta, Northwest and Continental) along with a few other large airlines such as 
British Airways, Air France, KLM (of Holland) Japan Air Lines, Singapore 
Airlines, Cathay Pacific (Hong Kong) and Qantas (of Australia) are the dominant 
users. A recent spate of mergers and alliances has meant that these huge 
companies are now even more intertwined. They also share an outstanding safety 
record, performing well above the industry's average safety rate. 
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Regional Disparities 
Boeing's long running analysis shows that there are serious disparities in 
the accident rate depending on region. Between 1959 (when jet aircraft were first 
introduced) to 1992 the overall incidence of accidents varied from 0.9 crew-
caused accidents per million departures in Australia, to 5.9 per million in Asia 
(Phelan, 1994). The disparity is further illustrated by the fact that while 84% of 
the world's large jets are owned and operated by the handful of airlines mentioned 
earlier, less than a third of all accidents are attributable to aircraft operated by 
these companies (Faizi, 1996). 
This leads us to the inescapable conclusion that airlines that can account 
for only 16% of the aircraft are responsible for 70% of the accidents. These 
figured are supported by an earlier analysis by Capt. Heino Cesar (quoted in 
Johnston, 1993) which shows that airlines with less than fifty aircraft, though 
accounting for less than 40% of the world's fleet strength, were involved in over 
58% of all accidents between 1959 and 1988. It appears that smaller airlines, 
operating in less developed parts of the world, are at the greatest risk, though the 
data is still subject to interpretation. 
Accident Prevention Strategies 
In an effort to remove the ambiguities of this analysis, the Boeing Safety 
team then analyzed accident prevention strategies, the techniques that may have 
prevented the accident from taking place had they been used. This too led to some 
stark conclusions. North America and Europe, the areas with better accident rates 
(the Middle East and Australasia were not plotted, as the accident rate in these two 
regions was too low for meaningful analysis) showed significant differences to 
Latin America, Africa and Asia. In the latter three regions, it was found that if the 
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flying pilot had adhered to Standard Operating Procedures, the accident might well 
have been prevented (Russell, 1996). 
Though couched in very guarded language, this comment mirrors to some 
degree the traditional scapegoat for all aircraft accidents. Historically they have 
been viewed as the pilot's fault (Beaty, 1995) and many strategies have been taken 
to eliminate this factor. Among the most prevalent of these has been the increasing 
use of automation in modern airliners. 
Automating the Flightdeck 
Cockpit automation is a difficult term to define adequately. Dr. Earl 
Wiener, one of the pioneer researchers in the field offers the following definition: 
"By cockpit automation we generally mean that some tasks or portions of tasks 
performed by the human crew can be assigned, by the choice of the crew, to 
machinery." (Wiener, 1988, pp.436) 
Early Automation 
The search for automated flight control is almost as old as the quest for 
powered flight. Orville Wright is credited with inventing one of the first 
successful devices (Pendergast, 1980) but the introduction of the sophisticated and 
very capable automatic systems this paper is concerned with, coincided with the 
introduction of the jet aircraft. The high speed and altitude at which these aircraft 
operated required the augmentation of the flight control systems to provide greater 
authority throughout the flight envelope. For example, the swept wing design of 
these types led to a control problem, known as "Dutch roll", that had never been 
encountered before. In order to prevent this condition, "yaw dampers", devices 
that automatically prevent Dutch roll from occurring were developed (Wiener, 
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1988). Modern aircraft have a host of such devices, the majority of which function 
faultlessly for the most part. 
Automatic Landing Capability 
Airlines are slaves to their schedules and landing at the destination airport, 
whatever the weather, has long been a priority of airline managers. The challenge 
was to design a system that would enable landings in poor forward visibility. A 
fundamental choice in the scope and type of the automation that would 
accomplish this, led to a very significant fork in the road being reached in the late 
1960's. At the time "head up displays" (HUDs) which project the instrument 
landing display onto the cockpit windshield and retained the pilot as an integral 
controlling element of the aircraft, were under development. For a number of 
reasons however, automatic landing systems which removed the pilots from the 
control loop while the aircraft landed itself, won out (Wiener & Curry, 1980). As 
a result of this decision, the pilot's role of a monitor, or manager, of an automated 
system that flew the aircraft itself, became entrenched. Reversion to manual 
control became a fallback procedure in case the automation malfunctioned. 
Widespread acceptance of this role has led to a gradual diminishing of the pilot's 
role and an insidious increase in the degree and scope of cockpit automation. 
Raising the Threshold of Automation 
Automation became accepted as a "good thing" and manufacturers vied 
with each other to introduce more and more automated systems with every new 
model of aircraft. This trend seemed to pay dividends, with a noticeable dip in the 
accident rate becoming evident. The most sophisticated of the early wide-body jet 
transports, Lockheed's L-1011 Tristar, was in many ways the safest aircraft of its 
time, having a hull loss rate much lower than it's contemporaries (Curtis, 1997). 
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Incorporating a fully digital autopilot and an autoland system capable of bringing 
the aircraft safely to the runway in zero forward visibility (Lockheed, 1983), the 
Tristar was a technological marvel, though not a commercial success. A great deal 
of less visible automation was also incorporated into the design, including the 
automatic deployment of back-up systems and even the application of wheel-
braking after landing. The success and reliability of these "improvements" 
appeared to vindicate the inclusion of ever more sophisticated automation. 
The Electric Jet 
The next generation of jet aircraft was to set another trend. Mechanical 
flight instruments were swapped for electronic displays and Flight Engineers were 
replaced by on-board computers, reducing the crew complement to two pilots. 
These Electronic Flight Information Systems (EFIS), were nicknamed "glass 
cockpits" (or less charitably "electric jets") due to the use of cathode-ray displays 
in place of the mechanical dials found in earlier types. The lower cost and ease of 
maintenance of these instrument displays led to them becoming an industry 
standard in a very short time. Newer variants of the industry's most popular 
aircraft types such as Boeing's best selling 737 and McDonnell's DC-9 were soon 
to have glass cockpits as standard fit. Though popular with the airlines, it was 
found that pilots of the MD-80 family found very little utility or workload 
reduction in these aircraft as a result of the automation (Wiener, 1985). 
Pressure from the Manufacturers 
The manufacturers were the prime movers behind incorporating the 
advanced technology available. Fuel economy was the watchword of the eighties. 
Precise vertical navigation and more efficient power plant control were key 
elements in achieving this. As processing power improved and became cheaper, 
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functions that pilots were accomplishing at the limit of their capabilities were 
easily achieved by the advanced automation available. While manual flying of 
these new aircraft was possible, it was neither recommended nor encouraged. 
Pilots were evaluated largely on the basis of their ability to make full use of the 
vastly more capable integrated flight path and aircraft management systems now 
in place (Billings, 1989). 
One of the most vocal proponents of pushing the envelope of automation 
has been the European manufacturer Airbus Industrie (Moxon, 1999). Airbus went 
to great lengths to incorporate automation into their aircraft from the design stage. 
The introduction of the Airbus A-320 with its electronic flight control systems 
(a.k.a. fly-by-wire) and control laws that could override pilot input, witnessed the 
highest degree of automation in service. In many ways this initiative by Airbus 
forced the hand of the other manufacturer's, who due to customer demands were 
close to " putting a padlock on the flight deck door" (Billings, 1989) and freezing 
further advances in cockpit automation. 
The Dividends of Automation 
The accident rate of these advanced aircraft were significantly better, so 
much so that Dr. Wiener referred to this in his key note address to the Ohio State 
Aviation Psychology Symposium stating that, ".. .no one has been killed or 
injured in a US operated glass-cockpit aircraft" (Wiener, 1993). The industry 
seemed to be entering a golden age, where technology had defeated the demons. 
The tide however was fated to turn all too soon. A rash of Airbus accidents 
(attributable at least in part to operator error) and three B-757 crashes in less than 
a year shattered the myth. With several more EFIS equipped Boeing and Airbus 
aircraft having being lost since then, the accident statistics have once again 
plateaued at the mid-70's figure of 1.4 accidents per million departures (Curtis, 
1997). A recent compilation of accident statistics (Bordoni, 1997) cites the 
flightcrew-automation interface as a contributory factor in six accidents just in the 
last decade. In a chilling comment on the trend toward more and more advanced 
automation, Billings (1997, pp.187) states, "I believe that automation complexity 
has been at least part of the problem.. .(due to) the human operators not fully 
understanding its intended function." 
Laboratory Research into the use of Automation 
The team of Nadine Sarter and David Woods has contributed much of the 
laboratory research into this field. A series of studies published in 1992, 1994 and 
1995, show interesting trends among pilots using automatic systems. The earlier 
studies (which were on 737-300 aircraft) showed that pilots tended to "adopt and 
stick with a small repertoire of strategies" when dealing with automation (Sarter 
and Woods, 1992). A degree of "knowledge miscalibration" where the pilots 
actually knew less of the systems than they thought they did, was also noticed. 
Later research was conducted on the Airbus 320, an aircraft that incorporates what 
the authors dubbed "strong and silent" automation, that will prevent the pilot 
from exceeding certain pre-set limits (Sarter and Woods, 1995). Pilot knowledge 
of little used automation functions was found to be poor and 80% of the subjects 
said they had been surprised on occasion by what the automation did. 
Other laboratory experiments (Parasuraman, Molloy and Singh, 1993) 
indicated that automation use could lead to decreased vigilance. A study funded 
by the FAA expressed concerns that"... manufacturer's flightdeck automation 




Numerous field studies on pilot use of automation have also been 
conducted. The MD-80, one of the first glass-cockpit aircraft in airline service, 
was the subject of an extensive NASA sponsored research project. Though the 
study found that pilot acceptance of the automation was high, a degree of 
skepticism was also present, especially among older pilots. Workload reductions 
were judged to be moderate and positive contributions to safety were questioned 
by many of the respondents (Wiener, 1985). Other commentators have stated that 
glass cockpits actually increase the pilots' workload (Rochlin, 1997). 
A similar study on the B-757 (Wiener, 1988) and a follow-up study by the 
Australian Bureau of Air Safety (BASI) in 1997, have found these trends to be 
still present, over a decade later. Pilots who flew the B-757 were almost equally 
divided on whether automation (which was touted to reduce their workload) 
actually accomplished any such thing. The BASI report, which is probably the 
most comprehensive study to originate outside of the USA concluded that: 
Automation appears to have contributed to the overall safety health of 
airline operations and is generally accepted by pilots; however, results also 
point to the existence of specific automation-induced errors that could 
result in safety hazards. Some of these errors are more easily corrected 
than others. Some may be addressed by airline policy or SOPs, while 
others are insidious, latent and extremely costly and time-consuming to 
address. (BASI, 1998) 
Increasingly, the industry and it's regulating agencies began to be greatly 
concerned with the persistence of automation related errors. The degree of 
concern led to the FAA commissioning a thorough investigation into the interface 
14 
between pilots and automation which resulted in a landmark report on the issue 
(FAA, 1996). The investigation team mentions 24 accidents and incidents, 
including ten fatal crashes, which can be attributed to a failure of the interface 
between the pilots and the automation on board the aircraft. Subsequent to this 
report there have been at least two more accidents (Bordoni, 1997) that appear to 
have similar causes. 
Modern jet aircraft are far safer than the types they have replaced. The 
extent to which increased cockpit automation has made a positive contribution to 
this trend however, is hard to determine empirically. The end-users still suffer 
from misconceptions about the systems and are occasionally unable to use them 
appropriately. The lack of a "human-centered" approach to cockpit automation is 
possibly the root cause for this confusion (Billings, 1989). 
The Role of Culture 
The regional disparities in the accidents rate has already been mentioned. 
An early researcher into this phenomena, Capt. Neil Johnston of Aer Lingus, 
pointed out that this conclusion holds true only for the total number of accidents, a 
figure that includes short-range jet aircraft. Quoting figures generated by Boeing, he 
shows that wide-body, long-range aircraft show an almost identical accident rate, no 
matter what the country of registration (Johnston, 1993). An analysis of" The 
World's Safest Airlines" (Stoller 1990, quoted in Johnston) showed that more 
accidents occur in Latin America than any other part of the world, irrespective of 
the nationality of the airline [italics added]. South American airlines operating in 
other parts of the world have accident rates similar to most other airlines from those 
regions. In attempting to explain the reasons for this, the Boeing research team 
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stated,"... the differences in fleet composition and the varying infrastructure makes 
direct comparison between regions impossible." (Russell, 1996) 
This sort of reasoned, logical approach, is rarely to be found in the popular 
press. A recent article first published in the Washington Post was typical in giving 
an incomplete though ostensibly accurate account of regional differences. 
In the past decade, only five of the world's hundreds of airlines have had 
four or more fatal crashes, and four of them are Asian: Air India with 
seven, Korean Air with five, China Air with four and Garuda Indonesian 
with four. One U.S. airline made the list: US Air ~ now US Airways ~ 
with five." (Phillips, 1998) 
The source for these figures was not quoted and they disagree with those 
given in other compilations (e.g. Bordoni, 1997). However the impact was 
considerable. Asian airlines were branded as unsafe, with allusions being made 
that this was due to the cultural influences of their native lands. 
What is National Culture? 
The seeming conundrum between accident rates, infrastructure differences, 
increased automation and crew performance, led to an greater focus on cultural 
issues. The seminal work on culture in the workplace, is that of Professor Geert 
Hofstede. In a wide ranging study that analyzed data from employees of IBM, 
possibly the world's first truly global corporation, Hofstede (1984,1996) 
identified four dimensions of cultural variation at the national level. These defined 
the principle criteria by which countries were seen to differ. The indices were 
labeled Power Distance (PDI), Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI), Individualism-
Collectivism (IDV) and Masculinity-Femininity (MAS). 
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Power-Distance refers to the manner in which subordinates accept the way 
they are treated by their superiors; a measure of relative social inequality which 
can be referred to in aviation terms as the "gradient" in the cockpit. Uncertainty 
Avoidance addresses the way members of a cultural group coped with the 
unpredictable, with rule orientation, and stress. IDV describes the relationship 
between the individual and society. Strongly individualistic cultures such as the 
U.S. (which had the highest IDV score in Hofstede's study) give more primacy to 
personal initiative and individual achievement. The opposites of this are 
collectivist cultures, those that value loyalty to family, group or caste above the 
needs of the individual. Masculinity refers to the duality of the sexes, with 
societies where gender roles are clearly distinct scoring high on the scale. This last 
index did not correlate in the UT studies among pilots (Merritt, 1996). 
Similar work has been done in the arena of international business by Fons 
Trompenaars, who found a great deal of overlap with Hofstede's research 
(Trompenaars, 1993). In addition to five orientations on personal interaction, 
Trompenaars found two items that related to the environment and the treatment of 
time. A recent study in the Far East which conducted research based on 
Hofstede's model but using a questionnaire composed by Chinese scientists, also 
found an additional dimension related to time (Hofstede, 1997). 
Relating National Culture to the Accident Rate 
Using the guidelines established by Hofstede, Johnston (1993) attempted 
to correlate country cultural indices with the worldwide accident rate. The Boeing 
Safety group then attempted to correlate these indices to accident rates worldwide 
(Russell, 1996). While Masculinity and Uncertainty Avoidance did not show 
significant correlation, countries with high Power Distance and low Individualism 
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scores were found to have significantly higher accident rates than those with the 
opposite characteristics (Johnston, 1993). More recent research by Boeing has 
confirmed this finding. Countries with high PDI and low IDV scores have 
accidents rates 2.6 times higher than cultures with low Power Distance and high 
Individualism (Russell, 1996). Worth noting is that the United States, which has 
produced the majority of the world's jet aircraft, has among the highest 
Individualism and lowest Power Distance scores in Hofstede's study. 
Applying Cultural Analysis to the Flightdeck 
As part of the continuing effort to increase safety, research began focusing 
on methods that could reduce human error in the flightdeck and increase crew 
coordination. Out of this quest came a system that focused on group dynamics, 
leadership, communication and decision making skills, what is known today as 
Crew Resource Management or CRM (Kanki, Wiener and Helmreich, 1993). 
Under a grant from NASA, a team of researchers from the University of Texas led 
by Dr. Helmreich of the Psychology Department, have been at the forefront of an 
effort to further investigate the effects of culture on workplace values and 
performance. The UT Aerospace Crew Research Team has gathered data from 
over 8,000 male commercial pilots from 22 airlines in 15 countries in seeking to 
reproduce Hofstede's dimensions within the pilot community. Hofstede's Power 
Distance, Individualism and Uncertainty Avoidance indices replicated 
successfully between country level scores of pilots and the IBM employees of 
fifteen years ago. The study concluded that national culture has a powerful effect 
on a pilot's professional performance, and that training and international 
regulations need to reflect an awareness of these differences (Merritt, 1996). 
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A related study by the UT team that focused on the use of automation 
(Sherman, Helmreich and Merritt, 1998) found that while pilot's from twelve 
countries (with the exception of Irish crews) overwhelmingly preferred flying 
automated aircraft, endorsement levels for even higher degrees of automation 
were very low. In total, the average difference in support among different 
nationalities for flying automated aircraft was only 53%. Other research has linked 
pilot's levels of experience and perceptions of company policies regarding 
automation use with some potential threats to safety in the crew-automation 
interface (Sherman, 1997). 
Further research into culture by the UT team has led to the conclusion that 
culture is best divided into three predominant sectors. National culture, which is 
deeply ingrained, professional culture (in this case that of the pilot community) 
and the organizational culture of individual companies (Helmreich & Merritt, 
1998). 
Mixing Cultures 
Another dimension is added when the recent trend towards airlines 
recruiting pilots from more than one country is taken into account. Many carriers in 
the Far and Middle East do not have a large military or general aviation system 
from which to recruit pilots. They have been forced to employ qualified crews from 
wherever they can (McCully, 1991) with " expatriate" pilots often forming the 
majority of crew members in some rapidly expanding companies (W. Ferrao, 
personal communication, July 22 1998). This is a trend that can have serious 
consequences. Will the two national cultures represented in the flightdeck be 
compatible? What are the possible strengths and weaknesses of such an 
arrangement? 
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An anecdote from one Asian airline that employs pilots from eight nations, 
is of relevance. The only personality clash that occurred in the flightdeck, took 
place between an Australian and a New Zealander, two highly individualistic 
cultures (Merritt, 1993). In fact, high individualism may not be an attribute that is 
too desirable in a cockpit, something that a Japanese pilot (Yamamori in Wiener, 
Kanki & Helmreich, 1993) pointed out when saying, ".. .neither the (collectivist) 
Japanese way of behavior nor the (individualistic) American are the best. " 
Statement of the Hypothesis 
Significant differences in the basic cultural values between people from 
different nations have been found to intrude into the workplace, including the 
flight deck of modem airline aircraft. Differences have also been found in the 
manner that pilots from different cultures deal with the automation that is an 
integral part of modem aircraft. The implications of this in designing training and 
safety programs are profound. 
It was expected that the documented characteristics of national, 
organizational and professional cultures would have an impact on the pilot 
populations of the two airlines studied. It is hypothesized that significant 
differences in the attitudes toward advanced automation and strategies employed 




To adequately test the hypotheses, receiving data from a broad cross 
section of pilots from different cultures was imperative. The returns from this 
study were compared to the figures that already exist for airlines in mono-cultural 
situations in order to define any changes from the norm. The countries of the 
Indian Sub-Continent (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal, known 
collectively as "South Asia") are a significant omission from the existing pool of 
data collected by the UT Aerospace Crew Research team. For this reason it was 
decided to seek figures from an airline in South Asia and compare the data 
obtained both to historical data and to figures from South Asian pilots within the 
multi-cultural airline. The study used the descriptive research technique in order to 
analyze the current state of interaction between pilots and automated flight deck 
systems (Gay, 1992). 
The Data Gathering Instrument 
The Flight Management Attitudes Questionnaire (FMAQ) was the 
instrument developed by the UT team for gathering data on culture in the cockpit 
(Merritt, Helmreich, Wilhelm and Sherman, 1996). The FMAQ includes sections on 
company management attitudes, work goals, cockpit behavior and automation 
usage. This study focused purely on the sections that dealt with automation-pilot 
interaction and pilots' general preference for automated cockpits. It was thought that 
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a short survey was more likely to be answered and the non-controversial subject 
matter would help encourage participants to respond. 
The reliability and validity of the FMAQ has been established by the work 
of the UT team (Merritt, 1993,1996), (Merritt, Helmreich, Wilhelm & Sherman 
1996) who obtained consistent data that was further validated by comparison to 
Hofstede's dimensions of culture. Therefore it was accepted that the FMAQ 
questions are a robust measure of pilot behaviors and attitudes. The seventeen 
FMAQ questions that dealt with automation were the core of this study (Appendix 
A). The focus of the questions is spread among four measures of pilot attitudes 
toward automation. The questions were scattered through the instrument to prevent 
any pattern recognition by the respondents. A five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly 
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree) was used answer 
all questions. 
Automation preference. Two items measured pilot preference for automated 
aircraft. 
*>• I prefer flying automated aircraft. 
>> I look forward to more automation - the more the better. 
Automation concern. Four items addressed pilot concerns about automated 
aircraft. 
>> Under abnormal conditions, I can rapidly access the information I need in the 
FMC. 
>> It's easy to forget how to do FMC operations that are not performed often. 
*)• lam concerned that the use of automation will cause me to lose flying skills. 
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*> There are modes and features of the FMC that I do not fully understand. 
Automation discretion. Pilot perceptions of their ability to select the level 
of automation. 
*>- The effective crewmember always uses the automation tools provided. 
*)• Pilots should avoid disengaging automated systems. 
*>- I regularly maintain flying proficiency by disengaging automation. 
*>• My company expects me to always use automation. 
>f I feel free to select the level of automation at any given time. 
•> Automated systems should be used at the crews' discretion. 
>> I try to use automation as much as possible during flight operations. 
Recognition of communication effects. Good crew coordination would 
require more communication between crewmembers, particularly when using 
some of the less transparent modes of the autopilot. Four questions seek to 
measure this value. 
•> Automated cockpits require more verbal communication between 
crewmembers. 
*>• Automated cockpits require more cross-checking of crewmember actions. 
>> Flying highly automated aircraft alters the way crewmembers transfer 
information. 
>> It is difficult to know what FMC operations the other crewmember is 
performing. 
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The second part of the questionnaire was purely demographic and 
collected personal information about the respondents. In addition to questions 
about age, flying experience, initial training, type ratings held and national 
origins, two questions addressed the use and familiarity with personal computers. 
Survey Population 
The airlines 
This report studied the management of advanced automation among pilots at 
two very different airlines. The first airline (A) is over fifty years old and is the 
national carrier of a small Asian country. Pilots are normally recruited from citizens 
of the country and the airline is largely staffed with nationals. Primary types flown 
are manufactured by Airbus, the A-320 being used for regional operations and the 
A-340 for long haul flights. Airbus generated SOPs are used throughout the fleets, 
with very little modification. A dwindling fleet of Lockheed L-101 Is is also in use, 
though these are to be gradually phased out and replaced by A-330s. 
The second company, Airline B is based in the Middle East. It is relatively 
young having been in existence just over twelve years. It has grown from one 
aircraft to over two dozen in a very short period of time. As a result of this rapid 
expansion, the company has been compelled to recruit its pilots from all over the 
world. Currently over 40 nationalities are represented among the 337 pilots, a large 
though by no means unique mix of nationalities. Many companies in Asia have this 
sort of cosmopolitan mix of crews (McCully, 1991). Aircraft types in current 
operation are the Airbus A-300-600, A-310-300 and Boeing 777. The former two 
types are very similar and the pilots fly both concurrently. A-3 30s are due to 
gradually replace the earlier Airbus types beginning mid-1999. 
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Another interesting feature of these two particular companies is that they 
have large numbers of relatively young pilots flying very recent equipment. This 
combination is rare in the Western world due to the seniority driven labor 
agreements in force with most established airlines. Neither of the companies used 
for this study is constrained by this sort of labor practice. Rapid expansion and a 
tradition of hiring less experienced pilots into cadet programs, have led to 
interesting demographic profiles in the pilot bodies of both companies. 
By comparing the figures for the two airlines, this research project set out to 
determine if there were any significant differences in automation usage among 
pilots from different cultures. As mentioned earlier, the Asian airline was studied 
mainly for use as a yardstick for measuring regional attitudes toward automation. 
Figures from Airline B were analyzed for significant differences between the 
cultural/regional groups represented among its pilots as well as other demographic 
criteria collected by the survey instrument. It was expected that there would be 
significant differences among some of these groups. 
Sample size 
Total population to be surveyed was in the region of four hundred and fifty 
pilots. (Sample size required for this size of population is just over two hundred -
Gay, 1992). Therefore census surveys were conducted at both companies in order to 
generate sufficient responses to enable a valid sampling. Response rates were 
identified as being the critical uncontrolled variable in this study. Previous efforts to 
gather data at the Middle Eastern airline were fairly successful. The return rates 
were high (over 50%) but there were significant gaps in the nationalities represented 
(Merritt & Helmreich, 1997). Anecdotal evidence indicates that many pilots were 
wary of answering questions on certain subjects (such as cockpit behavior) which 
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were regarded as sensitive issues. Therefore, only automation items were selected 
from the FMAQ and the survey length was kept to an absolute minimum. It was 
hoped that non-controversial subject matter in this survey coupled with personal 
appeals would allow the different groups of the company to be well represented. 
Similar appeals were made at the Asian airline. 
Distribution Method 
Approval was obtained from the Flight Operations Department managers of 
both airlines for conducting this study among their crews. The survey instrument 
was then distributed to all pilots' company mailboxes. In addition to personal 
appeals from the writer, endorsement from respected pilots and managers was 
sought to ensure a high response rate. In the case of Airline A, the pilots' 
association endorsed the survey, which helped considerably. 
A box for collection of the completed survey forms was placed in the pilots' 
briefing rooms of both companies. Initially, one month was given for the collection 
of the completed questionnaires. The first returns from Airline B were entered into a 
computer database and analyzed for return rates by nationality, fleet type and rank. 
Groups who were under-represented were sent personal appeals calling for 
participation in the survey. 
Summary of the Data 
Airline A 
Final results from Airline A were very encouraging on the Airbus fleets, 
with 44 of the 68 pilots returning completed surveys. Pilots on the L-1011 were not 
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well represented however, with only 6 replies being received from a total of 44 
crewmembers (M. L. Ratnayake, personal communication, November 7,1998). 
Table 3.1 
Respondents from Airline A by aircraft type 
Aircraft type Captains First Officers Total 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ 
L1011 3 3 6 
Total 24 26 50 
Note: All respondents were South Asian. 
Airline B 
Returns from Airline B were much as expected, with 180 of the 337 pilots 
responding. Around 50% of pilots on both the principal fleets responded. While 
most of the replies were received from line pilots (though a greater number of 
Captains than First Officers returned completed surveys), a fair representation was 
received from instructors and management pilots of the company (Table 3.3). 
Responses were received from pilots of 30 nationalities and were grouped into 7 
cultural groups, rather than nationality (See Table 3.2). Hofstede strongly advocates 
such an approach stating," In research on cultural differences nationality - the 
passport one holds - should be used with care. Where it is possible to separate 
results by regional, ethnic or linguistic group, this should be done." (1996, pp. 12). 
Ultimately, there remained seven groups of countries, with strong 
representation from South Asia and Australia/NZ (n = 61 and 62 respectively), 
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reasonable numbers for Western Europe (n = 46) and Southern Africa (n = 23). 
North American (n = 14) and Arab (n = 17) figures were within reason though it 
would be hard to base any firm conclusions on these groups. Returns from pilots 
who were citizens of former Eastern Bloc (n = 7) countries were poor (See 
Appendix B for full details). 
Table 3.2 
Respondents from Airline B by cultural groups and aircraft type 
Aircraft type 









































Note: Divisions by nationality may be found in Appendix B. 
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Table 3.3 
Respondents from Airline B by rank and flight status 
Flight status Captains First Officers Total 
Management 8 0 8 
Simulator Instructors 25 1 26 
Line Instructors 9 0 9 
Line Pilots 66 71 137 
Total 108 72 180 
A total of 230 completed surveys were received from both airlines, 
exceeding the required sample size for the population in question (Gay, 1996). 
Treatment of Data and Procedures 
Once all the data was collected and entered into the computer database, a 
computerized statistical program (Statistics Package for Social Sciences) was used 
to analyze the data. While national culture was the primary focus of the study, other 
types of "culture" were also scrutinized. The total sample size (n = 230) meant that 
these other variables had significant representation for comparison. Agreement of 
each of the four categories of questions was also analyzed with respect to 
organizational culture (airline and aircraft type/manufacturer), aviation experience, 
age, and the difference between military and civilian aviation cultures, determined 
by the initial flight training received by the respondents. Ultimately these rather 
diverse criteria proved to be at least as interesting as national culture. 
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One item (the highest level of education completed by the respondents) 
could not be analyzed because the question was badly phrased. "College" in many 
parts of the former British colonies refers to secondary school education, rather than 
university, as is usual in the USA (The survey instrument is in Appendix B). This is 
a good illustration of the possible pitfalls that await any research into cross-cultural 
issues. Anecdotal evidence indicated that the answers given to this item were 
inconsistent and would lead to inaccurate analysis. Therefore the item was rejected 
and not used for any comparisons. 
Chi-square analysis was used to test the stated hypotheses. Cultural groups 
and the other variables detailed above were cross-tabulated with the different items. 
Relationships that did not prove to be significant at the p = 0.05 level were not 




Calculation of Chi- Squares was the principle means used in determining 
whether any of the groups in question were significantly different from their 
peers. In addition to culture, analyses were conducted for airline, aircraft type, 
aviation experience, age, rank and initial flight training (i.e. military or civilian-
trained pilots). Areas of focus were the four categories of questions: 
>>• Preference for automation 
*>- Automation concern 
•f Automation discretion 
*> Communication in the flightdeck 
Each of the item categories will be reported in turn. In each section, the items 
will be presented with the applicable demographic variable. Only those 
associations that were found to be significant at the p= 0.05 will be reported. All 
associated cross-tabulations of the variables are to be found in Appendix C. 
Preference for Automation 
01 - 1 prefer flying automated aircraft 
Table 4.1 













Note: Only items of significant %2 are reported 
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Agreement with this item was widespread with only a handful of pilots 
disagreeing at all and no "disagree strongly" responses recorded (Table C-l). 
Agreement was especially high at Airline B, with only one pilot disagreeing out of 
the sample of 180. Overall, this tallies with the results of the UT research where 
pilots overwhelmingly endorsed this item. Since the item proved to be non-
significant when compared to culture and nationality, it appears that at least in this 
respect the results of this study tally with the much wider body of data collected 
previously. 
Interestingly, two of the pilots who disagreed with the statement were over 
fifty years of age and very experienced. The other two were younger, with very 
little experience. This was a definite trend with younger pilots being less 
equivocal in supporting automation than their elders. It also appears that 
enthusiasm for automation was high with all but the youngest group of 
pilots (Table C-2). The majority of pilots less than age twenty chose to remain 
neutral, possibly indicating they have not yet made up their minds on the issue. 
0 6 - 1 look forward to more automation - the more the better 
This item showed significant variation in the UT research, with Asian and 
Latin American countries displaying much higher agreement than European and 
English-speaking countries (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). Though culture proved 
to be significant in this study, the agreement scores were not as robust. Once again 
it must be noted that the largest group of pilots were those who chose to remain 
neutral to this item. This is especially marked in the case of the South Asian 
pilots, who fly the most advanced aircraft (A-320/330/340) in the population 
surveyed for this study. The only group where a majority of the respondents 
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agreed with the item was the Arab pilots (71% agreed) which also was the group 
with the lowest (6%) representation of ex-military pilots. 
Civilian-trained pilots came out in support of more automation to a greater 
degree than their military-trained colleagues did. 38% of civilian pilots agreed 
with this item compared with only 22% of the latter. A smaller percentage (26% 
vs. 38%) of civilian-trained pilots disagreed with the statement, further evidence 
that military-trained pilots appear to have no interest in seeing an increase in the 
level of flight-deck automation. This difference in the professional pilot culture of 
the two groups was marked and encountered quite frequently in this survey. It 
must be noted though that the majority of pilots in both groups chose to remain 
neutral to this item (Table C-3). 
Table 4.2 




Initial training 9.596 
Aircraft type 23.352 
Note: Only items of significant yl are reported 
The tendency of military-trained pilots to disagree with this item appeared 
to effect the cultural groups scores. South African pilots were particularly 
vehement in disagreeing with the item. The fact that over 65% of these pilots were 










of ex-military pilots (39%) were the Australians, 40% of whom also disagreed 
with this item. 
Pilots who flew different types of aircraft also responded differently to this 
item (Table C-4). Airbus aircraft are accepted as having the highest degree of 
automation in current service (Moxon, 1998). The majority of pilots who flew the 
A-320/330/340 series aircraft tended to remain neutral in response to this item as 
did pilots who flew older model Airbus, though to a lesser degree. Conversely, 
Boeing 777 pilots were more open in disagreeing with this item. Analysis of the 
differences between pilots of different aircraft at Airline B were non-significant, 
though the Boeing 777 crews were still the largest group who disagreed with the 
item. 
Automation Concern 
Only one of the four items regarding automation concern proved to be 
significant in this study. This itself is quite interesting, as most of the pilots 
surveyed felt quite comfortable with the use of the FMC, though most of them did 
agree that automation could cause a deterioration of their flying skills. 
02 - Under abnormal conditions I can rapidly access the information I need in the 
FMC. 
There were no cultural differences in the responses to this item. Responses 
between the two airlines were not significant either, with aircraft types and age 
groups also following suit. It appeared that experience played the strongest role in 
the confidence pilots have in FMC operations. It may well be that familiarity with 
the airline aircraft and FMCs in general makes it easier for pilots to access their 
features. Experience may also lead to a better understanding of the underlying 
architecture of the system. 
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Table 4.3 
"Under abnormal conditions I can rapidly access the information I need in the 













Note: Only items with significant yl are reported 
Ex-military pilots however, appeared to be less confident of their expertise 
in the use of the FMC than their civilian-trained brethren. However it may be that 
they are more realistic in their approach. It must be noted that no pilots "disagreed 
strongly" with the item. 
Automation Discretion 
A number of the items in this section proved to be of interest. Whereas the 
survey group did not appear to be too different in their concern toward 
automation, they did differ markedly in the manner in which they coped with 
many automated systems. 
Q3 - The effective crewmember always uses the automation tools provided. 
Use of automation throughout the regime of flight is a matter of some 
controversy. This writer tends to agree with the statement, as the automation is 
generally the safest and most economical flight mode in normal conditions. Most 
pilots regardless of nationality or culture, tended to agree with this item with a 
clear majority (74%) doing so. There were no significant differences on culture, 
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aircraft type, rank, flight status or airline for this statement. The items that did 
compute as significant are shown in table 4.4 below. 
Table 4.4 
"The effective crewmember always uses the automation tools provided": 
significant demographic variables 
Item yl df p 
Age group 30.258 15 W\ 
Aviation experience 21.179 9 .012 
Initial training 11.284 3 .010 
Note: Only items of significant %2 are reported 
Younger pilots tended to agree with the item, though a large minority 
remained neutral (56% vs. 28%). Pilots between the ages of thirty and forty were 
the most emphatic in agreeing with the item, 85% of them doing so. Interestingly 
this age group was also the largest group in the survey population comprising 
exactly 50% of the sample. There were no responses in the "disagree strongly" 
category to this item. 
Those pilots with between ten and twenty year's experience, again the 
largest group, have come out very strongly in favor of this item. (This group 
probably included many of the same individuals who constituted the 30 - 39 age 
group discussed above.) Of interest is that many of the least experienced group 
(the younger pilots) once again chose to remain neutral and that no individual of 
any group disagreed strongly with the item. 
Military-trained pilots once again differed from their civilian brethren in 
response to this query (Table C-10). The total number agreeing remained 
approximately the same, 75% of civilian pilots and 70% of military doing so. 
However, very few (7%) ex-military pilots remained neutral and considerably 
more (22%) disagreed with the item. 
07 - Pilots should avoid disengaging automated systems 
The use of automation throughout the flight envelope is a matter of some 
controversy. In this case age, experience and initial training did not prove to be 
significantly different. The values that did prove significant are shown below. 
Table 4.5 
"Pilots should avoid disengaging automated systems": significant demographic 
variables 
Item y2 df p 
Culture 48.151 24 ^02 
Aircraft type 22.690 12 .030 
Airline 12.362 4 .015 
Note: Only items of significant %2 are reported 
The differences with relation to culture are fairly clear-cut (see Table C-
11). The more individualistic societies (Western Europe, Australia, South Africa 
and North America) disagreed with the statement. Pilots of the A-320/330/340 
series, who are almost all Asian, tended to agree with this item. This relationship 
can be seen in Table C-12. Given the mono-cultural nature of Airline A where all 
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the pilots are Asian, the difference is also evident (and significant) when 
comparing the two companies surveyed. 
010 - 1 regularly maintain proficiency by disengaging automation 
"Hand flying" the aircraft (disengaging the automation and controlling the 
aircraft without recourse to computerized guidance), is becoming increasingly rare 
in the airline world. In this writer's personal experience over fifteen years of 
airline flying, increasing congestion and rapid technological change have resulted 
in there being very few airports that permit a "visual approach" to be flown. The 
next item in the survey sought to measure pilot attitudes toward this issue. Only 
one variable, aviation experience, computed as being significant in this regard (%2 
= 21.166, df = 12, p< .05). Culture, age, airline, training and aircraft type all 
proved to be non-significant. 
The number of less experienced pilots who chose to remain neutral is 
worthy of note (Table C-14). That the majority of this group (65%) agreed 
strongly with the item and none of them disagreed with it, is interesting. Pilots 
with less than ten years experience were the smallest group in this survey 
comprising less than 10% of the sample, which means that very few conclusions 
can be drawn from these numbers. All other groups were consistent in their 
responses, with a definite linear trend apparent. The results indicate that as pilots 
gain experience they appear to disengage the automation more readily, an 
outcome that tallies with this writer's personal observations. 
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012 - My Company expects me to always use automation 
It is an increasing trend in the industry that airlines state an automation 
"philosophy" laying down the boundaries for the use of the automation that is so 
often an integral part of the aircraft's design (Sherman, 1997). Interestingly, 
neither of the airlines in this survey lays down any such guidelines to their pilots. 
In the absence of such a philosophy, it is not surprising that only one of the items 
computed as being significant. Simulator instructors came out as being 
significantly different to their line-pilot and instructor colleagues (%2 = 21.023, df 
= 12, p< 0.05) in relation to this item. Generally most pilots agreed with the item 
with the exception of simulator instructors. The Arab pilots were slightly different 
from the other groups in that their endorsement of this item was high, but the 
result was non-significant. 
Q13 - 1 feel free to select the level of automation at any time 
Selecting a level of automation to use on a given day is also not specified 
by either of the companies surveyed. Two items computed as being significant, 
culture (x2 = 42.773, df = 24, p< .05) and rank (jl = 10.630, df = 4, p< .05). All 
other items were not significant. 
The cultural figures are quite interesting (Table C-17) as a considerable 
number of pilots from Southern Africa remained neutral in response to the query, 
whereas pilots from the more individualistic countries were joined by the South 
Asians in agreeing emphatically with the statement. Only 50% of the South 
African pilots agreed, whereas the average scores for the Australian, European, 
North American and Asian pilots is over 87%. 
Captains were unambiguous in agreeing with the query, with just a handful 
disagreeing. Co-pilots were not quite as sure of themselves, though the tendency 
39 
was for them to agree as well. A sizable number of First Officers remained neutral 
and disagreed with the item (Table C-16). 
014 - Automated systems should be used at the crews' discretion 
The sharp disagreement scores of the Australian and Western European 
groups led this item to be significant in respect to Culture and Airline. 24% of 
pilots from the Antipodes disagreed, as did 26% of the Europeans. This led to the 
results being significantly different between the two Airlines as well, as can be 
seen below. 
Table 4.6 














Note: Only items of significant yl are reported 
The difference did not extend to the aircraft types. Age, experience, type 
of initial training and rank all proved to be non-significant as well. 
016 - 1 try to use automation as much as possible during flight operations 
Even though culture proved to be significant in the answers to this item, no 
significant differences were found between the airlines or the different aircraft 




"I try to use automation as much as possible": significant demographic variables 
Item y2 df p 
Age groups 36.754 20 XH3 
Initial Flight Training 12.361 4 .015 
Culture 50.518 24 .001 
Note: Only items of significant %2 are reported 
Military-trained pilots tended to disagree rather more than their civilian 
counterparts. The more mature crewmembers (over age 35) also tended to 
disagree, with this ratio increasing with age. Younger pilots were inclined to 
remain neutral. The only anomalous cultural group were the Arab pilots, but small 
sample size once again precludes any further speculation on this issue. 
Communication in the Flightdeck 
Good crew coordination arises from good communication. This is 
especially so when flying modem aircraft as many of the tactile clues as to 
intention are no longer available. Both Boeing (1996) and Airbus (1987,1992) 
emphasize the need for standard call-outs particularly when using the autopilot. 
Q9 - Automated cockpits require more verbal communication between 
crewmembers 
Responses to the first of the items that attempted to measure this value led 
to significant differences being noted among the two airlines, the cultural groups 
and pilots of varying experience. Pilots of the two airlines differed sharply in their 
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responses. This was due to the fact that 86% of pilots at Airline A agreed with the 
item as opposed to less than 60% of their counterparts at Airline B. The disparity 
is probably due in large part to the fact that pilots who do not speak English as 
their native language endorsed this query in large numbers. This trend can be seen 
in Table C-26 with Asian, Arab and Eastern European pilots all coming out 
strongly in favor of the item. This sharp disparity carried over to the aircraft types, 
with pilots at Airline A (who constitute the majority of those flying the A-
320/330/340 series) influencing the outcome (see Table C-24). 
Table 4.8 
"Automated cockpits require more verbal communication between 
crewmembers": significant demographic variables 
Item yl df p 




Note: Only items of significant %2 are reported 
Rank did not play a part in the responses to this query and neither did the 
type of initial training or flight status. While aviation experience did play a 
significant role, age did not. It appears that as pilots gained more experience, they 
saw less need for verbalizing their actions with agreement rates dropping sharply 











011 — Automated cockpits require more cross-checking of crewmember actions 
Cross-checking what the other pilot does, is in many ways a mantra of 
modem aviation. While many items are reversible, confirmation of what one is 
doing is a requirement of the Standard Operating Procedures developed by all the 
major manufacturers (Airbus, 1992, Boeing, 1995). Pilot perceptions of the 
relative value of cross-checking in the more modem aircraft were measured by 
this item. 
Table 4.9 
"Automated cockpits require more cross checking of crewmember actions": 
significant demographic variables 
Item y2 df p 
Culture 68.440 24 XKXJ 
Airline 18.160 4 .001 
Aircraft type 27.562 12 .006 
Note: Only items of significant %2 are reported 
In the calculation with relation to culture (see Table C-29) South Asian 
pilots were firmly supportive (86% agreement) of the item, which influenced the 
other two variables that proved to be significant. Since all the pilots at Airline A 
are South Asian the agreement rate when comparing the two companies is 
extremely close to the cultural value. Since most of the respondents at the Asian 
carrier fly the A-320/330/340 aircraft, this bias is reflected in the type comparison 
as well (see Table C-28). 
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There were no significant differences between Captains and First Officers 
or pilots of different status. Experience, age or the type of initial training did not 
influence responses to this item. 
015 - Flying highly automated aircraft alters the way crew-members transfer 
information. 
Responses to this query had only one significant difference between any of 
the variables. Most pilots agreed with the item, though a fair number chose to 
remain neutral. Captains differed from First Officers (%2 = 10.731, df = 4, p< .05) 
with more of the latter tending to remain neutral. While agreement rates were the 
same between ranks, more Captains (18% vs. 8% of F/O's) disagreed with the 
query. 
Ol7 - It is difficult to know what FMC operations the other crewmember is 
performing 
Conventional wisdom has it that it is very difficult to know what the other 
pilot is doing on the FMC. However, most pilots disagreed with this item 
preferring to believe that they were well aware of what the other crewmember was 
doing. Only three variables computed as being significantly different (see Table 
4.10). 
The South Asian pilots in Airline A were consistent in that a sizeable 
minority (26%, see Table C-30) agreed with the item, the only group to do so. 
This response carried over to the airline and aircraft type results as can be seen in 
tables C-30 and C-31. 
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Another possible reason for these results is that the core influence was the 
relative complexity of the FMCs in the A-320/330/340 series aircraft. The scores 
from Airline A could be influenced by this factor. However comparison between 
pilots on different types of aircraft at Airline B led to a non-significant result. The 
reason for this could be that the pilots who fly A-320/330/340 series at Airline A 
are part of the team involved in introducing this type to the company and their 
familiarity with the aircraft may have had an influence on the comparison. 
Table 4.10 
"It is difficult to know what FMC operations the other crewmember is 
performing": significant demographic variables 
Item y2 df p 
Airline 19.929 4 0^01 
Aircraft type 24.641 12 .017 
Culture 46.279 24 .004 
Note: Only items of significant %2 are reported 
Computer Literacy 
One query in the demographic section of the instrument related to 
computer use among the population surveyed. Subjects were requested to respond 
to the ownership of a Personal Computer (PC or Mac) and self assess their 
expertise in its use. 
Pilots at Airline A were found to have a low degree of Computer literacy, 
with 38% not even owning a computer. This disparity carried over to the other 
results, influencing the scores for aircraft type and culture. Three other items 
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appear to be related, with experience, rank and flight status all contributing to PC 
ownership. 
Military and civilian-trained pilots did not differ in the level of Computer 
literacy and age does not seem to play a part in this issue either. 
Table 4.11 
Computer literacy: significant demographic variables 







Note: Only items of significant %2 are reported 
Only three pilots chose to assess themselves as "Expert". All these 
individuals were employees of Airline B and are in their thirties. Two of them are 
Australian and the other from South Africa. More interesting is the fact that they 
all fall into the 10-19 year experience group, all of them being in their thirties. 
Pilots who did use computers were found to be significantly different with 
respect to only two items in the survey instrument. In response to "The effective 
crew-member always uses the automation tools provided", the more computer 
literate respondents tended to agree (j2 = 23.017, df = 12, p< .05). The responses 




















agreement scores. Those rating themselves as "expert" computer users were 
unanimous is their approval of automation, but the very small sample size of this 
group does allow any conclusions to be drawn. 
Responses to one item regarding FMC use (Question 8) also proved 
significant with regard to computer literacy (%2 = 27.598, df = 16, p< .05). Pilots 
who did not own a PC and novice users had no hesitation in agreeing with the 
item. Those who professed a degree of computer literacy were reluctant to agree, 
the majority of them preferring to remain neutral (Table C-40). 
CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was to research pilots' attitudes towards flight 
deck automation. It was recognized that culture would influence this to a great 
degree, but what is "culture"? In the case of pilots it is accepted that culture has at 
least three attributes. The first of course is the national culture of the individual 
pilot's native country. The second, the professional culture of aviation and 
aviators is well documented and is especially strong among pilots. Finally, it is 
recognized that organizations too have their own cultures, which are often the 
closest to the daily activities of their members. National culture is deeply 
ingrained and resistant to change, but is believed that professional and 
organizational cultures may be modified if there are strong incentives to do so 
(Helmreich, 1998). 
The results have shown that there are distinct differences between many of 
the demographic variables measured by the survey instrument. While national 
culture appeared to be fairly prominent, the lines between the categories were 
often blurred. Differences were found to exist between the two airlines, which 
carried across (in some respects) to the aircraft types flown by them. Interestingly, 
conspicuous variation among the various age groups, ranks, levels of experience, 
and between pilots from military and civilian backgrounds also emerged. This 
chapter looks in detail at some of the more prominent disparities and what could 
be the cause for them. 
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National and Organizational Culture 
National and organizational culture proved to be the most prominent of the 
variables investigated, with many items generating significant differences. 
However, all results in this section are tempered by the fact that the sample size of 
the groups involved was relatively small. 
Preference for Automation 
Pilots showed a strong preference for flying automated aircraft across all 
nationalities and cultures, with 85% of the sample agreeing with the first item in 
the survey instrument "I prefer flying automated aircraft". The aircraft flown by 
the survey population represents the cutting-edge of present technology. These 
aircraft represent the latest the industry has produced and there is an accepted 
belief among pilots that the airline industry is the pinnacle of professional 
achievement. (To draw a comparison, the majority of professional basketball 
players would probably agree that they "prefer playing in the NBA".) This attitude 
probably influenced the results to some considerable degree. What is interesting 
though is a divergence between pilots of the two companies in responding to this 
item (%2 = 11.931, df = 3, p< .01 - see Table 4.2). Large numbers of the sample 
agreed with the item, but 20% of pilots at Airline A chose to remain neutral. The 
relative youth of pilots at this airline is probably the cause of this result. 
A desire for even more automation in the future did not elicit responses 
that were quite as consistent. In this respect, the results of this study did not tally 
with the UT research, which found that" National groups who said they preferred 
flying automated aircraft also said they were looking forward to more automation" 
(Helmreich & Merritt, 1998 pp. 48). In this study, even though all cultures 
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preferred flying automated aircraft, three groups showed markedly less 
enthusiasm than the others for more automation (%2 = 41.651, df = 24, p<. 05). 
Pilots from Southern Africa, North America and the Antipodes disagreed with this 
item (see Table C-5). Interestingly all these cultures have been found to be highly 
Individualistic, with low Power-Distance scores. Most other cultures chose to 
remain neutral to this item, with only the Arab pilots showing an enthusiasm for 
even more automation in the future. The high Power-Distance nature of Arabian 
culture is well documented, but the sample size of this group (n = 17) means that 
any conclusion reached would be tenuous at best. 
Automation Discretion 
A number of groups turned out to be significantly different from each in 
respect to automation discretion. As will be seen though, some of the variation 
could well be traced to the organizational cultures of the two airlines surveyed. 
There is also some evidence that pilots of different types of aircraft have 
discordant views as well. This could be a reflection of the corporate cultures of the 
two main manufacturers of commercial jet aircraft. 
Disengaging the automation could be interpreted as a measure of high 
Individualism and low Power Distance. Indeed the analysis of Question 7 "Pilots 
should avoid disengaging automated systems" (%2 = 48.151, df = 24, p<. 01), 
would seem to support this view. As with the previous item discussed, pilots from 
the more individualistic societies (Western Europe, Australia, Southern Africa and 
North America) disagreed with the item, while those from high Power Distance 
cultures tended to agree (Table C-ll). Pilots at Airline A were far less likely to 
disengage the automatic systems than their counterparts at Airline B (%2 = 12.362, 
df = 4, p< .05). While this could be a result of national culture or company policy, 
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it more likely reflects the equipment the pilots fly. Forty-four of the fifty pilots 
from Airline A who responded to the survey fly the A-320/330/340 series aircraft, 
which are equipped with advanced fly-by-wire systems capable of overriding pilot 
input. 
Using automated systems at the crews discretion (Question 14) also 
showed significant differences among cultural groups iy2 = 45.213, df = 24, p<. 
05). What is interesting in this example though, is the level of emphasis in 
agreeing with the statement. Pilots from highly individualistic cultures tended to 
agree, but so did the sizeable South Asian contingent. Pilots from Southern Africa 
however were overwhelmingly in agreement, with only two individuals from this 
region disagreeing. This could well be an example of a difference in the 
professional culture of pilots from Southern Africa. Anecdotal evidence gathered 
by this writer indicated that these pilots spend much of their early years flying in 
the "bush" where basic flying skills are at a premium and automation is often not 
available. It could well be that these habits have been carried over onto the airline 
world. 
Conversely, pilots at Airline A who have relatively little general aviation 
experience, also agreed with this item to a greater extent than their counterparts at 
the Middle Eastern company (%2 = 16.576, df = 4, p< .01). This outcome is 
possibly evidence of a distinct difference in the organizational cultures of the 
airlines. Having been an employee of both companies, this writer is well aware of 
a more relaxed atmosphere and less intrusive management style (lower Rules and 
Order in Merritt's terms) at the Asian airline. 
Should pilots use automation "as much as possible"? (Question 16). While 
most pilots tended to agree with this item, significant differences emerged once 
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more (%2 = 50.518, df = 24, p<. 01). Australian pilots were the least enthusiastic 
and Arab pilots the most. There is a definite evidence of consistency in the Arab 
pilots' attitudes to automation as seen earlier in Question 6. It is a pity that the 
small sample size makes it impossible to draw any firm conclusions. 
Communication in the Flightdeck 
Due to the plethora of autopilot modes and features available, procedural 
requirements to call out any selections and changes made in the automation are 
commonplace (Boeing, 1995). This leads to more verbal communication in the 
cockpit of modem airplanes than in earlier equipment. Question 9 in the survey 
instrument set out to measure perceptions of this value. Culture emerged as a 
significant variable (%2 = 45.921, df = 24, p<. 01) though with a very interesting 
twist. English is the most widely used language in aviation and both the 
companies surveyed use it as the sole language for technical and operational 
matters. The groups that came out strongly in favor of this query were those that 
did not speak English as their native language. For example 86% of pilots at 
Airline A, all of whom are at least bilingual and use their second language 
(English) in the flight deck, agreed with the item. It appears that native English 
speakers are far more blase about the importance of good communication, a 
potentially unhealthy trend (Table C-26). 
Crosschecking of crewmember actions is another vital practice when 
flying modem airplanes. Question 11 sought to measure this value and once again 
culture emerged as significant (%2 = 68.440, df = 24, p<. 001 - see Table 4.38). 
The anomalous groups in this case were the South African and Western European 
pilots, both of whom tended to agree less (and disagree more often) with the item. 
It is hard to arrive at a firm conclusion for this result, because it is not replicated 
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either in the UT research (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998) or in this survey. The Asian 
pilots at Airline A were very consistent in agreeing with the item, a healthy and 
professional habit. 
Directly related to monitoring the other pilot's actions, is the ability to 
understand what he or she is doing. Question 17 "It is difficult to know what FMC 
operations the other crewmember is performing", addressed this issue. 
Conventional wisdom has it that it is very difficult to know what the other pilot is 
doing on the FMC. As can be seen in Table C-32 however, most pilots disagreed 
with this item preferring to believe that they were well aware of what the other 
pilot was doing. Sarter and Woods (1992) found that pilots adopt and use just a 
handful of the available FMC operations. This theory would support the findings 
of this survey, as pilots who only use a few FMC strategies would have no 
difficulty in recognizing what their colleagues are doing on the keypad. The 
differences found between cultural groups (%2 = 46.279, df = 24, p<. 01) could be 
attributed to differences in language. Over 75% of native English speakers and 
Western European pilots disagreed with the item, with South Asian pilots 
(especially those in Airline A) the only group that showed any significant 
agreement. The nature of the A-320/330/340 automation could be a factor as well. 
This type has the most advanced (and complex) FMC in service. While only a 
slim majority of A-320/330/340 pilots disagreed with the item, over 71% of B-777 
pilots did so. Whether the root cause is the complexity of the Airbus FMC, or the 
poor technical knowledge of the pilots at Airline A, is hard to say with any degree 
of certainty (Tables C-28, 30 & 31). 
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Computer Literacy 
The inclusion of this dimension, a departure from the questions compiled 
by the UT research team, was done at the suggestion of one of this writer's thesis 
committee. The spread of results is certainly interesting and culture was one of the 
criteria that computed as being significant (%2 = 47.228, df = 24, p<. 01). The 
South Asian pilots, most of whom worked for Airline A, were the largest group 
without PCs (Table C-36). When the figures were analyzed only for Airline B the 
result is non-significant, which shows that the responses from Airline A played a 
large part in the outcome. 
At first glance this result appears to be contradictory. A large number of 
individuals who fly some of the most technologically advanced and extensively 
computerized aircraft in the world do not have a computer for their personal use. 
However pilots of Airline A are all nationals of a country that has a very low 
penetration of home computers (Peterson, 1998). Living in a closely knit society 
with family and friends residing in the same city, a significant portion of the pilots 
of this airline seem to be content living their lives without the benefits or 
frustrations of using a PC at home. In stark contrast, most of the pilots at Airline B 
are expatriates who live far away from home. With the explosive growth of the 
Internet, the PC is emerging as a communication tool above all else. This writer's 
personal experience indicates that pilots at Airline B use e-mail and the other 
communication capabilities of the home PC extensively, making a computer a tool 
rather than an indulgence. 
Another possible reason is financial. Currency depreciation and the Asian 
economic crisis have meant that anyone paid in local currency has seen a sharp 
drop in real earnings all over the region. In addition, this writer's personal 
experience is that salaries in the Asian airline are much lower than those at the 
Middle Eastern Company, which pays at international levels in order to attract 
expatriate pilots. These two factors probably have had a serious impact on the 
ability of pilots at the Asian airline to afford a computer, even if they desired one. 
Responses to Question 8, "There are modes and features of the FMC I do 
not fully understand" also proved to be significantly different (%2 = 27.598, df= 
16, p< .05), though not in any obvious pattern. Over 60% of novice computer 
users agreed with the item. While agreement fell to 30% for those who admitted 
they were still learning the intricacies of a PC, 43% of respondents who rated 
themselves as "skilled" also agreed with the item. None of the three computer 
experts in the survey sample agreed with the item, though two of them did elect to 
remain non-committal. 
Aircraft Types 
Differences between the aircraft types surveyed emerged on many counts 
some of which are attributable to either cultural or airline specific responses. The 
enthusiasm for more automation (Question 6) is very interesting, as there do not 
appear to be any other influences on this item. The significance of the result 
between aircraft types (%2 = 23.352, df = 12, p< .05) possibly stems from the 
response of pilots who fly the B-777 aircraft, 42% of whom disagreed with the 
item. Popular belief has it that Boeing builds "pilot's airplanes" whereas Airbus 
tends to be more engineer-oriented. Indeed, the automation on the 777 is not 
intrusive and can be overridden by the pilots (Boeing, 1995). This supposition has 
been supported by Helmreich and Merritt (1998) when discussing the relative 
cultural values of American and French societies. The response to this item would 
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lend support to that theory, as pilots who fly the Boeing 777 do not appear to 
support any increase in the level of automation (Table C-4). 
Three items regarding cockpit communication were significant relative to 
aircraft type. Question 9, "Automated cockpits require more verbal 
communication between crewmembers", (%2 = 33.261, df = 12, p< .01) has been 
discussed with relation to the Airline A. However, the degree of the emphasis 
placed by A-320/330/340 pilots of this company is noteworthy (Table C-24). 
Pilots at Airline A have been flying this type of aircraft for some years now, 
unlike at Airline B where it is yet to reach line service. It is quite likely that the 
degree of automation found in this aircraft compels pilots to verbalize their actions 
more so than in other types. For instance, the "side-stick" control on this type (the 
B-777 uses a conventional control wheel) does not give any feed-back to the non-
flying pilot as to the flying pilot's actions (Airbus, 1992). It is quite natural that 
this feature would lead to more talking in the flightdeck, in order to keep both 
pilots "in the loop". 
Question 11, "Automated cockpits require more cross-checking of crew 
member actions" (%2 = 27.652, df = 12, p< .01) could be a carry-over from the 
strong Asian agreement, as well as another example of how pilots react to the high 
level of automation in the A-320/330/340 aircraft. The latter case becomes more 
plausible when responses of B-777 pilots are scrutinized. A sizeable portion of 
Boeing pilots disagree with the item, which could well be a reflection of the far 
more "pilot-friendly" automation design of this manufacturer's aircraft (Table C-
28). 
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Aviation Experience and Age 
The two airlines surveyed have one very interesting shared characteristic. 
Due to the lack of a General Aviation sector in their home countries, both 
companies recruit cadet pilots (low-time or ab-initio employees) who then go on 
to fly very advanced airline equipment with relatively little experience. This is a 
common practice in Asia and the Middle East (McCully, 1993), but is very rare in 
the Western world. Analysis of the data revealed that twelve of the twenty pilots 
with less than ten years aviation experience are from South Asia and Arabia, 
which would indicate they are products of cadet programs. Over half the 
respondents were less than forty years old, 24% less than age thirty-five. 
Almost 40% of the youngest pilots were found to be undecided on whether 
they "Preferred flying automated aircraft" (Question 1). A lack of exposure to 
non-automated aircraft due to their relative youth probably does not qualify this 
group to form an opinion on this item. 
Accessing the features of the FMC under abnormal conditions (Question 
2) proved to be significant in this regard (y2 = 18.414, df = 9, p< .05). The more 
experienced pilots were more assured of their ability to use the FMC. This is a 
wholly understandable response, as becoming familiar with an FMC requires 
exposure to modem airline aircraft. 
Little used knowledge tends to be lost. This is definitely the case with 
computers, as any regular user will testify. This is especially so in the case of 
FMC operations, as the systems used even in the most modem aircraft are archaic 
syntax driven interfaces, far removed from the GUIs found in personal computers. 
In this writer's experience, little used FMC operations are hard, if not impossible, 
to recall easily. The textual nature of the interface does not help, as any minor 
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mistake in the command line will result in an error message, much like the DOS 
machines of an earlier generation of computers. Interestingly, experience was the 
only variable that came out as significant with reference to item five in the survey 
instrument "It's easy to forget FMC operations that are not performed often" (%2 
= 27.520, df = 12, p < .01). Most pilots agreed with this item, with the more 
experienced the individual the higher the assent, the results being quite linear. The 
least experienced group of pilots had the lowest agreement (65%) but also the 
highest neutral response (35%). Perhaps these pilots, who have been flying 
automated aircraft for probably a very short while, do not realize the extent of 
their ignorance? 
Among pilots automation is often referred to as a "third crewmember with 
a safe pair of hands". In other words, it can be used as a tool to reduce the 
workload and free up resources for other tasks. Agreement with Question 3, "The 
effective crewmember always uses the automation tools provided" would seem to 
reflect this view (%2 = 21.179, df = 9, p< .05). Pilots with between ten and twenty 
years experience were quite confident in agreeing with this item. Conversely, 
younger less experienced pilots tended to remain neutral or disagree with the item. 
The most interesting response though was that of the veteran pilots with more than 
thirty years of maturity to draw on. Over 26% of this group disagreed with the 
item. 
Maintaining flying proficiency by disengaging the automation (Question 
10) also led to significant differences based on experience (%2 = 21.166, df = 12, 
p< .05). The results were quite linear with experience directly corresponding to 
agreement. The least experienced group also had the least agreement with the 
item, possible evidence of a lack of confidence in their basic flying skills. 
Those pilots with less than ten years aviation experience agreed the most 
with the item "Automated cockpits require more verbal communication between 
crewmembers" (Question 9). The significance of the item (%2 = 24.929, df = 12, 
p< .05) stems from the fact that 85% of this group agreed with it. Without much 
experience to draw on, pilots with less than ten years of flying expressed a strong 
preference for verbalizing actions, a positive and healthy response. 
Pilots in the low experience bracket were the least likely to own a PC (%2 
= 30.737, df = 12, p< .01). The reasons for this could be financial. The expense 
and lengthy nature of training as a pilot, probably means these individuals have 
not been working in a well-paid position for very long. Given that a professional 
pilot would use a PC mainly for leisure activities, purchasing one is conceivably 
not very high on their list of priorities. 
Rank 
Rank is closely associated with age and experience, as flight time is a pre-
requisite for promotion to command. The demographic details support this 
assertion since 63% of the Captains are over age forty and 82% of First Officers in 
this survey sample have less than twenty years total experience. The differences in 
perception depending on rank only computed as significant on one item. 
The latitude to select the degree of automation (Q13 -1 feel free to select 
to select the level of automation at any time) appears to be a privilege of 
command among the pilots surveyed. While most respondents agreed with the 
item Captains were more comfortable in doing so. This could indicate a relatively 
steep "cockpit gradient", where co-pilots do not feel as comfortable in making 
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decisions of this type. It must be noted, that neither of the companies in this 
survey have any clear-cut guidelines for the use of automation. 
Flight Status 
Flight status, refers to the position (as opposed to rank) the individual 
holds within the company. Respondents were offered four choices in the survey 
instrument (see Appendix A) in response to this item. The majority of those who 
did respond classified themselves as "Line Pilots", the worker bees of the airline 
world. 
The item "My company expects me to always use automation" (Question 
12) would be hard to answer in the case of the two airlines in this survey, as 
neither lays out any firm guidelines for the use of automation. Line pilots tended 
to agree, instructors remained neutral and simulator instructors were evenly split 
(x2 = 21.023, df = 12, p< .05) on the issue. The majority of Management pilots, 
who should be formulating the policy, agreed with the item. 
Initial Training 
The military has historically been a fertile recruiting ground for the airline 
industry. Both airlines surveyed for this report have a sizeable percentage of 
military pilots, with 35% of pilots in Airline B being ex-military, as opposed to 
16% of Airline A. The type of initial training proved to be significant in three of 
the categories in the survey instrument. Anecdotal evidence gathered from ex-
military fliers indicates that habits are instilled firmly during basic training. These 
behaviors include the freedom to explore the limits (both personal and that of the 
equipment flown) to a far greater degree than in the civilian world, where safety 
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and economy are the primary focus. In the world of military aviation, there is far 
less replication of standard maneuvers and more latitude to experiment. That some 
degree of this training carries over to the civilian world, is not surprising. 
Ex-military pilots were markedly less enthusiastic when responding to 
Question 6, "I look forward to more automation" (%2 = 9.596, df = 4, p< .05). 
Evidently most ex-military pilots felt that the level of automation in current 
aircraft was more than sufficient. 
Civilian trained pilots were more prepared to agree with Question 2 
"Under abnormal conditions I can readily access the information I need in the 
FMC", than their ex-military counterparts (%2 = 10.381, df = 3, p< .05). Military 
trained pilots have probably embarked on a second career when entering the 
airline world. This has led them to be far more experienced, with 50% of this 
group having more than twenty years of experience. Since this item was also 
significantly related to experience, it is probably related to maturity as a pilot. 
Two items that related to automation discretion proved to be significant 
when comparing military and civilian-trained pilots. Ex-military pilots tended to 
disagree in larger numbers with Question 3, "The effective crewmember always 
uses the automation tools provided" (%2 = 11.284, df = 3, p< .01). Question 13, (I 
feel free to select the level of automation....) also showed the influence of early 
training in the military. Most pilots who were trained in the military either 
disagreed or remained neutral to this item. The disagreement rates were especially 
marked among respondents from Southern Africa, many of whom served in the 
"bush wars" that plagued the region in the recent past. This was also case with 
Question 16, "I try to use automation as much as possible during flight 
operations", (%2 = 12.361, df = 4, p< .05). It would appear that being trained in 
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the military, where automation is not as prevalent as in the civilian world, leads to 
a noticeable preference for manual control of the aircraft. It must be noted though, 
that ex-military pilots who do not use the automation are in the minority in both 
cases. Over 70% of the group agrees with Question 3 and those who prefer to 
"hand fly" constitute less than 15% of all the ex-military flyers. 
Computer Literacy 
Familiarity with computers appeared to have an effect in that pilots who 
were computer literate used the automation more frequently than those were not. 
Pilots with a higher level of familiarity with computers tended to agree with the 
item "The effective crewmember always uses the automation tools provided" in a 
linear fashion (%2 = 23.017, df = 12, p< .05). All those who rated themselves as 
"expert" agreed with this item, with only 52% of novice users concurring. This 
writer firmly believes that the prudent use of automation serves to reduce cockpit 
workload considerably, so this can be interpreted in a positive light. 
However computer users' showed a degree of overconfidence in 
responding to Question 8, "there are modes and features of the FMC I do not fully 
understand". The moot point in this item, is whether any pilot can fully understand 
all the modes and features of the FMC. Laboratory studies have shown that this is 
doubtful (Sarter & Woods, 1992,1994). A representative of Airbus Industrie has 
gone on record to state that FMCs offer too many features, only 20% of which are 
used regularly by pilots (Hughes, 1995). Helmreich and Merritt (1998) found that 
overconfidence in the ability to use automation strongly correlated by nationality. 
In this study culture proved to be non-significant, with experience and initial 
training be the only variables that affected the results. It would appear that 
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computer literacy leads to a degree of overconfidence with regard to using the 
FMC, a unhappy trend. 
In this writer's opinion, the most interesting response was the one item that 
generated the greatest consensus across every demographic group. Over 50% of 
all the respondents agreed with the statement "I am concerned that the use of 
automation will cause me to lose flying skills". The unanimity of opinion was so 
broad that responses proved to be statistically non-significant in all categories. 
This is in contrast to the UT surveys where some national groups tended to 
disagree with the statement, a sentiment especially marked among the Far Eastern 
countries (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). The only anomalous group in this survey 
were the Arab pilots, 47% of whom disagreed with the item. However, the results 
(%2 = 26.634, df = 24, N.S.) did not compute as significant due to the strong 
agreement among all other nationalities. 
When taking into account the responses to items that probed the use of 
automation at all stages of the flight and the frequency with which pilots 
disengaged the autopilot, the picture becomes a little clearer. All the respondents 
appear to admit that automation degrades their basic flying skills. Yet it was the 
older and more experienced pilots who appear to be confident enough to use it as 
circumstances demand and disconnect should the conditions permit them to do so. 
Whether this degree of discretion can be taught or if it can only be developed 
through experience is a matter of some conjecture. 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
Automation is a technology of choice for the overwhelming majority of 
pilots who responded to this survey. They all fly advanced new technology 
aircraft and appear to revel in doing so. Encouragingly, they also seem to realize 
that the technology probably causes a long term deterioration of their basic flying 
skills and make a conscious effort to disconnect the automation frequently in order 
to maintain proficiency. A higher degree of automation was not endorsed by many 
pilots despite their enthusiasm for the technology, a point that the manufacturers 
should bear in mind when designing the next generation of aircraft. 
The research hypothesis postulated that the attitudes displayed by pilots of 
different national cultures when flying advanced automated aircraft would be 
significantly different. At least as important as the issue of national culture, were 
the possible implications of organizational, professional and experience based 
sub-cultures, on the items of the survey instrument. As it turned out, strong 
representation was achieved only for a few national cultures, but returns on many 
of the sub-cultures proved to be rather intriguing. 
National Culture 
The highly individualistic nature of "Anglo" cultures (a collective noun for 
native English speakers - Helmreich & Merritt, 1998) was noticeable in the 
responses to several items. This was especially marked in items that had to do 
with pilot discretion in the use of automation. While the Anglo agreement is no 
surprise, the strong South Asian endorsement of some of these items is interesting. 
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It would appear that Individualism scores within this culture are possibly quite 
high. While Hofstede's (1984) research did not include this particular Asian 
nation, it was stated that increases in national wealth could influence 
individualism scores. A more recent research study conducted in the same 
country found that educational level, occupational status, overseas experience and 
English language fluency all worked toward shifting segments of society from 
collectivism to individualism (Freeman, 1997). Since these factors are all 
attributes of life as an airline pilot, it would appear that they had an influence on 
the results. 
In the same vein, items reflecting the Uncertainty Avoidance dimension 
approximated the values found in earlier research for most of the national groups. 
The South Asian contingent appeared to be generally close to the Anglo scores, 
which tallies with the figures for the region (Hofstede, 1984). A majority of all the 
groups surveyed endorsed the use of automation. Disagreement was highest 
among the more individualistic cultures. Agreement with this item was highest 
among the Arab and Eastern European pilots, possible evidence of high Power 
Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance. Another item where the Arab and East 
European pilots stood out was in their refusal to admit that it is hard to remember 
little used FMC operations. It is possible that the doctrinaire nature of these 
cultures make it very difficult for anyone to admit ignorance. Once again though, 
the small sample size of these two groups makes any conclusions arrived at more 
speculation than science. 
Native speakers of English stood out once again in their reluctance to 
endorse items calling for more communications in the flightdeck. Familiarity with 
the principle language of aviation appears to bias pilots against verbalization of 
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intent. Most pilots, irrespective of their native cultures, showed confidence in the 
use of the FMC. Items concerning rarely used modes and monitoring of the other 
pilot's use of the FMC did not come out as significantly different in any respect. 
Conventional wisdom in the Human Factors field states that modem FMCs are 
too complex for any pilot to understand completely. It would appear that pilots 
disagree with this assumption and are quite confident in their use of the 
equipment. This finding replicates pilot attitudes in other parts of the world 
(Sherman, Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). 
Organizational Culture 
It was unfortunate that the airlines studied operate distinctly different types 
of aircraft. Airline A has a fleet of the latest Airbus types and the majority of 
pilots who responded to the survey flew these aircraft. Airline B on the other hand 
operates the earlier model Airbus (A-310) and the most recent Boeing product, the 
B-777. Very little overlap of aircraft occurred between the two airlines, which 
meant that direct comparisons could not be made on most items. 
Some evidence emerged of differences in the organizational culture of the 
two airlines studied and the types of aircraft flown. It appears that pilots who fly 
the A-320/330/340 aircraft are more ready to verbalize their actions and closely 
monitor what the other pilot is doing on the FMC. The relative complexity of the 
latest generation Airbus FMCs appeared to be reflected in the prudence with 
which pilots used them. Airbus pilots also disengaged the autopilot less often than 
Boeing 777 pilots do. The latter group showed distaste for a greater degree of 
automation, practically mirroring the manufacturer's approach to the issue. 
The Asian pilots with Airline A showed strong endorsement for 
verbalizing actions in automated flightdecks. Whether this was due to the level of 
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automation in the aircraft they fly (A-320/330/340) or the fact that English is their 
second language could not be determined. All these differences discussed could 
arise from either the culture of the airline or the manufacturer of the aircraft. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to accurately determine from this study which 
has the greater influence due to the dissimilarities of the sample groups. 
Age and Experience 
The distinct differences that arose from age and experience were a surprise 
to this researcher. This could well be a peculiarity of the airlines surveyed, as they 
both have a relatively youthful complement of pilots. Age turned out to be a 
significant factor in the preference for automation, with older pilots having no 
hesitation in stating their liking for it. Younger pilots were undecided both in 
endorsement and the prolific use of automation. The older and more experienced 
the pilot, the greater the confidence shown both in the use of the FMC and in 
disengaging the automation and flying the aircraft manually. Those pilots with the 
least experience were the least likely to admit that they could not recall little used 
FMC operations. Conversely, the more experienced the pilot the more willing they 
were to admit forgetting infrequently used FMC commands. Not surprisingly, 
captains stood out in being more assured in selecting the degree of automation on 
a given day. This is understandable, as the final say on flightdeck etiquette rests 
firmly with the occupant of the left seat. 
Professional Culture 
Evidence also emerged of two distinct types of professional culture. 
Respondents from Southern Africa were distinctly in favor of using automation 
solely at the pilot's discretion. It must be bome in mind that pilots from this part 
of the world have a lot of exposure to flying in very basic conditions, where 
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automation is not available. Pilots from the Western world are often exposed to 
high degrees of automation even in commuter-type aircraft (Moxon, 1998). Those 
from the Middle East and Asia achieve airline jobs with relatively little experience 
due to cadet programs sponsored by the airlines (McCully, 1991). The extensive 
experience in manually flying light aircraft in the "bush" may have a lasting effect 
on pilots, which could be the root cause for the difference displayed by the 
African respondents. 
The other distinct difference arose in the divergent answers given by pilots 
depending on whether they were trained by the military or civilian establishments. 
Ex-military pilots did not endorse an increase in the level of automation and 
tended to use it less than civilian pilots. They also displayed a more realistic (or 
less proficient) approach to the use of the FMC. All these trends may stem from 
the fact that the military flying done by the sample of this survey was on less 
sophisticated equipment. Habits formed in the early years evidently carry on to the 
airline world, despite a sharp increase in the level and utility of the automation 
available on commercial aircraft. 
Computer Literacy 
Expertise in the use of home computers only impacted two items in the 
survey. The preference for computer-literate pilots to endorse a greater degree of 
automation is no surprise. The linear nature of the agreement scores would seem 
to indicate that the more familiar pilots are with using a computer, the more 
comfortable they are using automation as well. 
Responses to the item concerning familiarity with the FMC were more 
ambiguous. Those pilots who classified themselves as "still learning" the use of a 
home computer were anomalous, in that a majority of them disagreed with this 
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item, the only group to do so. It must be remembered that modem FMCs are 
extremely complex and only a few of the modes are used frequently. This writer 
firmly believes that no one can be wholly familiar with all the modes and features 
of the FMC. To deny this is evidence of overconfidence and in this case it may be 
said that a little knowledge appears to be a dangerous thing. 
Summary 
This report broke new ground in exploring two national cultures, Arabs 
and South Asians, that have not been studied before with respect to commercial 
aviation. It would appear that Asian pilots, even judging from the small sample 
available, have realistic attitudes toward the use of automation. Their responses 
were understandably tempered by the facts that their median age was relatively 
low and English is not their native language. The distinct flavor of Airbus 
automation may also have had an effect on their responses, though this could not 
be conclusively determined due to the reasons pointed out earlier. The Arab (and 
Eastern European) pilots proved to have strong and sharply divergent feelings on a 
number of issues. The small sample of size of these two groups was a 
disappointment to this writer, as it precludes any of the intriguing responses from 
being validated. 
The attitudes of younger crewmembers were a serendipitous find that has 
potentially serious implications. The high percentage of this group that chose to 
remain neutral to a number of items, is a matter of some concern. Pilots on the 
whole have strong opinions, no matter what their age group. For so many young 
pilots to not have an opinion, appears strange to this writer. That many senior 
pilots, who are likely to be instructors and managers have strong feelings not 
shared by their younger colleagues, is not a healthy sign. In the flightdeck of a 
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modem airplane there are only two pilots, who are quite likely to be of different 
generations and levels of experience. Any serious misunderstanding or 
disagreement between them could have grave implications, as may have been the 
case in a recent accident (Carley, 1999). 
The readiness of many of the sample population to admit that automation 
causes a degradation of their flying skills, was refreshing. What the survey 
instrument failed to address however, is how pilots view this fact. Anecdotal 
evidence gathered by this writer in the course of line-flying, seems to indicate that 
while pilots are aware of the fact that automation causes their flying skills to 
deteriorate and they make a considerable effort to remain proficient, most of them 
do not regard this as an alarming trend. Many pilots, appear to view manual flying 
as an indulgence that is enjoyable in the context of mild weather and a congestion 
free environment but is not advisable during inclement weather or when fatigued. 
Whenever the workload is high, automation is used to free up resources for better 
superintendence of the flight. It would appear, that pilots are slowly coming to 
terms with the viewpoint that flying automated aircraft in a long-haul environment 
causes the pilot to be more of a "manager' than an operator. This is a controversial 
opinion and one that this writer cannot statistically support. It does open an 
interesting area for future research though, which should not be ignored. 
CHAPTER 7 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Sample size was the biggest obstacle in this survey, as is probably the case 
with many research projects. Due to the small samples collected from certain 
cultural groups it is not possible to make recommendations on some of the more 
interesting findings, which is a disappointment to this writer. However, certain 
trends did emerge which lead to fairly definite conclusions. 
The survey instrument was also limiting in some respects as it does not 
sample pilot attitudes towards awareness of autopilot modes, particularly in the 
event of abnormal situations and failures. A disproportionate number of recent 
accidents have been attributed to the "flight crew automation interface" (Bordoni, 
1997). Survey items that seek to measure this factor would be a valuable addition 
to any future research. 
It became evident in the course of the analysis, that a number of gray areas 
exist in the items that dealt with automation discretion. Culture, both at the 
national and organizational level, had an impact on many of these items, an issue 
that needs to be addressed. There also appeared to be distinct differences in the 
way pilots react to automation depending on the type of aircraft flown. Given that 
the automation philosophy of the two principal aircraft builders is sharply 
divergent, this too is an area that cannot be ignored. Waiting for Airbus and 
Boeing to find common ground is something that individual airlines cannot afford. 
It may be necessary for the operators themselves, to take the distinct flavor of 
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each manufacturers' approach to automated flightdecks into account when 
designing SOPs for each aircraft type. 
Flight deck communication also appears to be a subject that needs some 
attention. Experience and proficiency in English seemed to be the key factors that 
influenced responses to this issue. With both the companies surveyed forecast to 
expand their operation in the near future, the increased need for pilots will 
inevitably lead to them recruiting more cadets. These young, inexperienced pilots 
who are nationals of countries that use English as a second language, need training 
in the use of automation as well as basic flying techniques. The thrust in this 
respect should be twofold. The desire for younger pilots to verbalize their actions 
and intent should be encouraged, while older and more experienced pilots must be 
reminded of the safety value of doing so themselves, especially when in a multi-
cultural environment. 
The computer literacy of the survey sample is also of more than passing 
interest. One of the companies, Airline B, uses an intra-company computer 
network for many routine administrative tasks such as leave processing, a roster 
bidding system for the crew, applications for staff travel tickets etc. In such a 
situation, an individual who is not computer literate is at a distinct disadvantage. 
While some of the respondents seemingly have no wish to own a PC, there is 
considerable evidence that many pilots are unable to acquire one for financial 
reasons. This is especially so among pilots who have been recently recruited, a 
group that needs to become familiar with the processes and privileges of a new 
work environment. 
More research into the areas mentioned must be undertaken, with 
particular emphasis on South Asian and Arabic cultures, which appear to have 
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interesting characteristics. For the purposes of the two airlines that participated in 
the survey, this writer is confident in making the following specific 
recommendations as a result of this study: 
1. Without further delay, generate a consensus of opinion on the use of 
automation in the context of each company's operations and then 
formulate an "automation philosophy" to reflect this thinking. Clear 
guidelines for the use (and disconnection) of the autopilot must be laid 
down, to prevent the apparent confusion that exists among younger 
crewmembers. It may be necessary to slightly vary the formula to 
reflect the differences between aircraft types. 
2. Emphasize during initial and recurrent training the importance of good 
intra-crew communication. Particular emphasis should be placed on 
stressing this necessity to pilots who are native English speakers, 
working with others who may not be familiar with the idiomatic use of 
that language. 
3. Allow younger and less experienced crewmembers more time to 
familiarize themselves with the basic handling characteristics of large 
jet aircraft. It may be necessary to review policies such as "zero flight 
time training" and reintroduce practice landings in the aircraft, 
especially in the case of younger and less experienced pilots. 
4. Provide for additional training and familiarity with FMC operations 
during initial and recurrent training. This should include a realistic 
appraisal of the capabilities of the system as well as its limitations. 
Extensive use of classroom based FMC training units is probably the 
best solution for this need. 
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5. Provide newly recruited pilots assistance to acquire and become 
familiar with the use of a personal computer. This would help in 
speedily integrating them with administrative functions of the company 
and may also help them gain confidence in accepting and using 
automation. 
Automation, though a valuable and in some respects indispensable tool in 
modem aviation, can be a potential source of safety concerns. In many ways 
automation introduces a new dimension to airline flying that cannot be addressed 
by the procedures and systems developed for an earlier generation of aircraft. The 
demands on crewmembers operating automated equipment needs to be addressed 
during initial and recurrent training to a higher degree than it is at present. By 
implementing the above recommendations and constantly monitoring the resulting 
efficacy of the human-machine interface, the two airlines surveyed should be able 
to maintain the perfect safety records they currently enjoy. 
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All answers refer to aircraft with advanced automation, which for the purposes of 
this survey is defined as those with a programmable FMC. Answer the questions 
for the aircraft you are currently flying. 











1.1 prefer flying automated aircraft. 
2. Under abnormal conditions, I can rapidly access the information I need 
in the FMC. 
3. The effective crew-member always uses the automation tools provided. 
4.1 am concerned that the use of automation will cause me to lose flying 
skills. 
5. It's easy to forget how to do FMC operations that are not performed 
often. 
6.1 look forward to more automation - the more the better. 
7. Pilots should avoid disengaging automated systems. 
8. There are modes and features of the FMC that I do not fully understand. 
9. Automated cockpits require more verbal communication between crew-
members. 
10.1 regularly maintain flying proficiency by disengaging automation. 
11. Automated cockpits require more cross-checking of crew-member 
actions. 
12. My company expects me to always use automation. 
13.1 feel free to select the level of automation at any given time. 
14. Automated systems should be used at the crews' discretion. 
15. Flying highly automated aircraft alters the way crew-members transfer 
information. 
16.1 try to use automation as much as possible during flight operations. 




Airline Years at this company as a pilot? 
Years in Aviation Age 
Initial flight training (check one) D Military D Civilian 
What is your nationality? 
What was your nationality at birth (if different from your present nationality?) 
Please indicate what region of the world you regard as home, (check one) 
D Aus./NZ U Arabia(GCC) • South Asia U Southern Africa D North Africa 
• Western Europe • Eastern Europe) • North America • Central America 
D Caribbean • Other (specify) 
Do you own/use a Personal Computer? (Y/N) 
If so, do you regard yourself as: 
• Expert D Moderately skilled D Still learning Da Novice 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
• High School • College D Post graduate 
Current A/C type & series 
How much experience do you have in this aircraft ? (hours/years) 
Crew Position: D Captain • First Officer 
Status: • Line Pilot • Instructor • Management 
Other significant experience in automated aircraft: 





Other commercial aircraft you have flown: 






RESPONSES BY NATIONALITY, REGION AND CULTURE 
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Table B-l 
Respondents by nationality and airline 













































































































Respondents by region and airline 























































Respondents by cultural group and airline 






































CROSS-TABULATIONS OF SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES 
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Table C-l 
Responses to "I prefer flying automated aircraft" by Airline 



















































Note: There were no responses in the "strongly disagree" category 
Table C-2 







30 to 34 
35 to 39 
40 to 44 






























































































Note: There were no responses in the "strongly disagree" category 
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Table C-3 


















































































































































































































































































































Responses to "Under abnormal conditions I can rapidly access the information I 




Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Total 




 % within 
aviation 35.0% 60.0% 5.0% 100.0% 
exp. 
10 to 19 
yrs 






























over 30 Count 3 1 13 2 19 
vrs
- % within 
aviation 15.8% 5.3% 68.4% 10.5% 100.0% 
exp. 
Total Count 15 41 142 32 230 
% within 
aviation 6.5% 17.8% 61.7% 13.9% 100.0% 
exp. 
Note: There were no responses in the "strongly disagree" category 
91 
Table C-7 
Responses to "Under abnormal conditions I can rapidly access the information I 
need in the FMC." by Initial training 
Crosstab 
Q2 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Agree 
Strongly Total 









































Responses to "The effective crewmember always uses the automation tools 






30 to 34 
35 to 39 
40 to 44 




































































































Note: There were no responses in the "strongly disagree" category 
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Table C-9 
Responses to "The effective crewmember always uses the automation tools 




Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Total 




 % within 
aviation 5.0% 30.0% 40.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
exp. 
10 to 19 
yrs 






























over 30 Count 5 1 7 6 19 
yrs- % within 
aviation 26.3% 5.3% 36.8% 31.6% 100.0% 
exp. 
Total Count 30 30 106 64 230 
% within 
aviation 13.0% 13.0% 46.1% 27.8% 100.0% 
exp. 
Note: There were no responses in the "strongly disagree" category 
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Table C-10 
ResDonses to " T h e effect ive crewmember alwavs 


























































Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Total 
Cultural Aus/NZ Count 12 26 12 9 3 62 
G r o u P s % within 
Cultural 19.4% 41.9% 19.4% 14.5% 4.8% 100.0% 
Groups ^ ^ _ _ 
W. Count 6 20 11 8 1 46 
Europe
 0 /oWJthin 
Cultural 13.0% 43.5% 23.9% 17.4% 2.2% 100.0% 
Groups 
E. Europe Count 2 3 2 7 
% within 
Cultural 28.6% 42.9% 28.6% 100.0% 
Groups 
~H. Count 1 8 2 2 i 14 
America o /oWi tn in 
Cultural 7.1% 57.1% 14.3% 14.3% 7.1% 100.0% 
Groups 
Arab Count 1 3 3 5 5 17 
% within 
Cultural 5.9% 17.6% 17.6% 29.4% 29.4% 100.0% 
Groups 
S.Asia Count 2 19 12 22 6 61 
% within 
Cultural 3.3% 31.1% 19.7% 36.1% 9.8% 100.0% 
Groups 
S.Africa Count 4 13 1 5 23 
% within 
Cultural 17.4% 56.5% 4.3% 21.7% 100.0% 
Groups 
Total Count 26 91 41 54 18 230 
% within 







































7 31 14 
9 9% 43 7% 19 7% 
10 9 71 





2 14 11 
4 0% 28 0% 22 0% 
20 3 50 

















26 91 41 
113% 39 6% 17 8% 
54 18 230 
23 5% 7 8% 100 0% 
TableC-13 




Strongly Disagree Neutral 
Agree 
Agree Strongly Total 















































Responses to "I regularly maintain proficiency by disengaging automation" bv 
Aviation Experience 






10 to 19 
yrs 





















































































Responses to "Mv Company expects me to always use automation" by Flight 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Responses to "I try to use automation as much as possible during flight 






30 to 34 
35 to 39 
40 to 44 









































































































Responses to "I try to use automation as much as possible during flight 



























































Responses to "I try to use automation as much as possible during flight 






































































































































Responses to "Automated cockpits require more verbal communication between 



























































Responses to "Automated cockpits require more verbal communication between 































































































Responses to "Automated cockpits require more verbal communication between 





























10 to 19 
yrs 








































2 3 1 % 
4 


























Responses to "Automated cockpits require more verbal communication between 











































































































































Responses to "Automated cockpits require more cross checking of crewmember 
actions" bv Airline 


















































Responses to "Automated cockoits require more cross checking of crewmember 


































































































Responses to "Automated cockpits require more cross checking of crewmember 
actions" by Culture 
Crosstab 
O i l 
Disagree Agree 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Total 
Cultural Aus/NZ Count 5 7 37 13 62 
G r o u P s % within 













































































S Africa Count 5 3 9 6 23 
% within 
Cultural 217% 13 0% 391% 261% 100 0% 
Groups 
Total Count 1 27 21 104 76 229 
% within 
Cultural 4% 118% 9 2% 45 4% 33 2% 100 0% 
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Table C-30 
Responses to "It is difficult to know what FMC operations the other crewmember 




Strongly Disagree Neutral 
Agree 
Agree Strongly Total 








16 1 % 
10 
5 6% 



































Responses to "It is difficult to know what FMC operations the other crewmember 
































































































Responses to "It is difficult to know what FMC operations the other crewmember 




Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Total 
Cultural Aus/NZ Count 6 40 13 3 62 
G r o u P s % within 



































N. Count 1 11 2 14 
America o/o within 




































S.Africa Count 2 16 3 2 23 
% within 
Cultural 8.7% 69.6% 13.0% 8.7% 100.0% 
Groups 
Total Count 23 140 41 22 4 230 
% within 
Cultural 10.0% 60.9% 17.8% 9.6% 1.7% 100.0% 
Groups 






to Comnuter l i teracv hv Av ia t i on Experience 
less than 
10 
10 to 19 
yrs 























































































ResDonses to Comnuter l i teracy hv F l iaht Status 






















No PC Novice 
35 31 
19 3% 17 1% 
1 5 












































































































Responses to Computer literacy by Airline 
Crosstab 
PC level 
No PC Novice 
Still 
Learning Skilled Expert Total 












































































































































No PC Novice Learning Skilled Expert Total 
Count 3 10 25 22 2 62 
% within 




° P e % within 
Cultural 
Groups 
E Europe Count 1 1 5 
% within 











S Asia Count 21 9 17 14 
% within 
Cultural 34 4% 14 8% 27 9% 23 0% 
Groups 




Total Count 36 38 91 62 3 230 
% within 
Cultural 15 7% 16 5% 39 6% 27 0% 1 3 % 100 0% 
Cultural Aus/NZ 
Groups 
4 12 18 12 46 
8 7% 26 1 % 39 1 % 26 1 % 100 0% 
7 
100 0% 
4 8 2 14 
28 6% 57 1 % 14 3% 100 0% 
2 1 10 4 17 
11 8% 5 9% 58 8% 23 5% 100 0% 
61 
100 0% 
5 1 8 8 1 23 
217% 4 3% 34 8% 34 8% 4 3% 100 0% 
Table C-39 
Responses to "The effective crew-member always uses the automation tools 
provided" bv computer literacy. 
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Note: There were no responses in the "strongly disagree" category 
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Table C-40 
Responses to "There are modes and features of the FMC that I do not fullv 
understand" by computer literacy. 
PC level * Q8 Crosstabulation 
PC 
level 
Total 
No PC 
Novice 
Still 
Learning 
Skilled 
Expert 
Count 
% within 
PC level 
Count 
% within 
PC level 
Count 
% within 
PC level 
Count 
% within 
PC level 
Count 
% within 
PC level 
Count 
% within 
PC level 
Disagree 
Strongly 
5 
5.5% 
3 
4.8% 
1 
33.3% 
9 
3.9% 
Disagree 
9 
25.0% 
10 
26.3% 
35 
38.5% 
21 
33.9% 
75 
32.6% 
Q8 
Neutral 
9 
25.0% 
5 
13.2% 
24 
26.4% 
11 
17.7% 
2 
66.7% 
51 
22.2% 
Agree 
17 
47.2% 
21 
55.3% 
24 
26.4% 
25 
40.3% 
87 
37.8% 
Agree 
Strongly 
1 
2.8% 
2 
5.3% 
3 
3.3% 
2 
3.2% 
8 
3.5% 
Total 
36 
100.0% 
38 
100.0% 
91 
100.0% 
62 
100.0% 
3 
100.0% 
230 
100.0% 
